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Presidential Succession Under
3 U.S.C. § 19 and the Separation
of Powers: "Ifat First You Don't
Succeed, Try, Try Again"
By AMERICO R. CINQUEGRANA*

Introduction
The attempted assassination of President Reagan in 1981 and his
incapacity during surgery for intestinal disorders in 1985 and 1987 momentarily focused the attention of the public, the media, academia, and
government officials on the question of the legal authority of a Vice President who succeeds a dead or disabled President.' Each occasion fostered
a brief national spasm and a temporarily heightened interest in the generally unknown constitutional mechanism that would be activated should
circumstance disable a President and require a transfer of authority to
the Vice President.2 These episodes represented a traumatic, but healthy,
public reminder of the potential for sudden changes in the Presidency
and resulted in more intensive planning to avoid the uncertainties that
had arisen in dealing with such exigencies in the past.3
For example, a few months after the 1988 presidential inauguration,
President George Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle met with their
wives and the White House Counsel and White House Physician to dis* Former Deputy Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, U.S. Department of Justice. B.A. 1968, University of New Hampshire; J.D. 1973, University of Virginia. The author would like to express appreciation to Senior Articles Editor Jill
Simeone, Articles Editor Emily Prescott, and Executive Editor Paul Carlson, whose thoughtful suggestions proved invaluable in the development of this Article. In addition, the author
thanks his wife, Hope, and daughter, Faith, who patiently endured the long hours of revision
during summer vacation. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author.
1. See, ag., Questions Raised: Who Was in Charge?, 39 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 580
(1981); George M. Boyd, Reagan Transfers Power to Bush for 8-hour Period of Incapacity,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1985, at Al; Walter V. Robinson, Reagan UndergoesSurgery Condition
Called Excellent,' BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1987, at 1.
2. See, e.g., WHITE BURKETT MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA, PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT (1989).

3. See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS 264-79 (1965) (explaining early
issues regarding the law of presidential disability).
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cuss presidential succession under the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.' As reported by the Washington Post:
In what is believed to have been an unprecedented session,
President and Barbara Bush met last week with Vice President and
Marilyn Quayle... to determine the circumstances under which
Quayle would take over as acting president [under the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to the Constitution] if Bush became disabled ....
The White House had been strongly urged to convene the
meeting by presidential scholars who cited the "chaos" that followed the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan
.... Confusion within Reagan's cabinet .. .led, among other

things, to then Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr.'s informing
the nation that he was in charge.
Former White House counsel Fred F. Fielding [explained that
on the day of the attempt on Reagan] "when I mentioned the 25th
Amendment I could see eyes glazing over .... They didn't even

know about the 25th Amendment."
Former senator Birch Bayh .... an author ... of the 25th

Amendment, said... "We all hope and pray that the president will
be healthy and successful and live to a ripe old age, but history has
taught us we had better be prepared for all eventualities." 5
The substance of the April 1989 meeting has never been made public. Nonetheless, by its mere occurrence, the meeting represented a significant increase in sensitivity to the need to clarify the operation of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment. This is the mechanism that has been available
under the Constitution since 1967 to bring order to a succession by the
Vice President if a President should no longer be able to perform the
functions of that office. 6
Unfortunately, succession issues tend to return to the subconscious
"unthinkable" category between crises and elections. In light of the recent presidential election, it can be expected that there will be a brief
period of renewed attention to the uncertain prospects for succession in
circumstances not yet adequately treated by the law.7 There may even be
4. This meeting may have been a direct result of a report provided by former Presidents
Ford and Carter to the President-elect and Vice President-elect in November 1988 urging that
a plan be established for presidential succession and continuity in the event of a nuclear attack
on the United States. See Maralee Schwartz & Bill McAllister, Ford, Carter Urge Plansfor
Facing the Unthinkable, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1988, at A23.

5. Judith Havermann & David Hoffman, PresidentialDisabilityDiscussed; At Scholars'
Urging,Bushes, Quayles Study Power-TransferIssue, WASH. PoST,Apr. 28, 1989, at Al, A16.
'6.See infra text accompanying notes 11-19.
7. See, e.g., Al Kamen, Pre-InauguralSuccession Law Murky; Congress Has Failed to
Providefor the Unthinkable, Experts Say, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21, 1988, at All (discussing
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some reference to the possibilities that exist for the assumption of the
Presidency by an official who has neither campaigned for nor been
elected to serve as President or Vice President.8
While the Twenty-fifth Amendment is tangible evidence of the increased attention that has been paid to the issue of vice-presidential succession to the Presidency, succession in the event the Vice Presidency is
also vacant has not been discussed to any great extent. Yet the potential
is real. Eight Presidents and seven Vice Presidents have died in office.
The Vice Presidency has been vacant for a total of almost forty years, or
twenty percent, of our constitutional history.9
It is at this level of succession-below the Vice President-that
there remains substantial room for unexpected developments, intrigue,
confusion, and ignorance of the relevant law at the highest levels of government if future circumstances leave both the President and Vice President dead or disabled. This almost unimaginable leadership crisis would
be governed by a largely unknown and generally ignored statute that provides for succession to the Presidency by senior government officials
other than the Vice President-3 U.S.C. § 19.10
This Article discusses that statutory provision and its constitutional
context. Most importantly, the Article explains that-by envisioning the
creation of an Acting President, drawn from the Cabinet, who would
effectively be a hostage to the congressional leadership at a time when a
national emergency may require the strongest executive action-the statute represents a fundamental breach in the separation of powers principle
upon which our government is based.
Part I of this Article describes the various provisions of law that
establish the succession process, particularly 3 U.S.C. § 19. Part II reviews the intent of the drafters of the constitutional provision that empowers Congress to enact a succession statute and how that intent
reflects upon the constitutionality of a statute allowing removal of an
Acting President without impeachment proceedings. Relevant separation of powers principles that have been developed by the Supreme Court
are explained in Part III. Part IV then applies these principles to demonissues if the President-elect or Vice President-elect should be rendered unable to serve before
their inauguration).
8. See, eg., Bill McAllister, A Tradition to Keep One Speechless; Cabinet Absentee is
Would-Be Successor, WASH. PosT, Jan. 29, 1991, at A17 (discussing practice of excluding one

member of the Cabinet from State of the Union addresses in the Capitol Building in order to
ensure the survival of at least one potential successor in the event of a catastrophe there),
9. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 3250 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); id. at 3265 (remarks of
Sen. Carlson).
10. See infra text accompanying note 34 for text of statute.
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strate the constitutional infirmity of section 19. Finally, several courses
of remedial action are proposed in Part V.

I.

Provisions for Presidential Succession

A. Constitutional Succession Provisions
The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution"
was ratified in 1967. This event culminated a lengthy effort, given impetus by the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, to resolve various
issues that had arisen over the years regarding vice-presidential succession to the Presidency. 2 The issues addressed in that Amendment include whether the Vice President becomes the actual or only the acting
President in the case of presidential death or disability, how a vice-presidential vacancy shall be filled, and what can be done to displace a men13
tally or physically disabled president.
11. The Amendment provides:
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation,
the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President
shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of
the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of
either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue,
assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session,
within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote
of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
1 12. See, eg., S. RaP. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (explaining requirement for
attention to succession problems).
13. These issues and whether they have been satisfactorily resolved by the Twenty-fifth
Amendment are beyond the scope of this Article. See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cin-
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In brief, the Amendment applies only to situations where there is a
vacancy in the Presidency due to the death, resignation, or removal of a
President, or where a President becomes disabled or is otherwise unable
to serve as President, or where there is a President but the Vice Presidency is vacant. Under section 1 of the Amendment,14 the Vice President would become President, not Acting President as had been asserted
by some previously,15 if a President should be removed, die, or resign.
Section 2 of the Amendment 16 provides authority for a President to
nominate an individual to fill a vice-presidential vacancy, subject to approval by a majority vote in both Houses of Congress. Section 317 contemplates a voluntary presidential declaration to the Congress of a
disability that requires the Vice President to become Acting President
until the President declares the disability removed. Finally, section 418
authorizes the involuntary removal of a disabled President by agreement
of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or some other body
designated for this purpose by Congress. 19 Thus, the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to the Constitution now provides the framework for vicepresidential succession when there is a physical vacancy in the Presidency or the occupant suffers some personal incapacity.
One of the original provisions of Article II of the Constitution supplies Congress with authority to provide for presidential succession in a
variety of other circumstances, specifically where neither the President
nor Vice President is fit to serve. 20 This provision includes the original
basis, clarified by the Twenty-fifth Amendment, for the Vice President to
assume the Presidency if the President is unable to perform the duties of
the office, and also empowers Congress to, "by law provide for the case of
removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice
quegrana, The Realities of PresidentialSuccession: "The Emperor Has No Clones," 75 GEO.
L.J. 1389, 1393-1416 (1987) [hereinafter Emperor] (describing the origins and evolution of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment and discussing several proposals to improve upon it).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
15. See RICHARD H. HANSEN, THE YEAR WE HAD No PRESIDENT 10-12 (1962) (dis-

cussing Secretary of State Daniel Webster's purported objection to Vice President John Tyler's
adopting the title of President when he succeeded President William Harrison in 1841); see
also infra note 21.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
19. The complexities of these provisions, their history, and development are described in
detail elsewhere. See, e.g., BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION (1968) (authored by the principal Senate sponsor of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment); MICHAEL DORMAN, THE SECOND MAN (1968). See generally Emperor,supra

note 13, at 1393-1400.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such
officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a Presi21
dent shall be elected.,
B. Statutory Succession Provisions
A statutory framework for succession below the Vice President, implementing the Article II authority, was considered by the First Congress and enacted in 1792 by the Second. 2 Congressional enemies of
then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson prevailed to limit succession to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, in
that order, with the Secretary of State relegated to calling a special presidential election within thirty-four days. 3 In 1886, the succession law
was revised to substitute the seven cabinet officers then in existence for
the congressional officers named in the earlier Act. 4 This change was
motivated by the fact that the two congressional offices frequently had
been unoccupied and by the concern, resulting from the impeachment
proceedings against Andrew Johnson, that a Senate President pro
tempore who was first in the line of succession would face a conflict of
interest in considering whether to support any movement to impeach a
President.2 5
Harry Truman became President in 1945 upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt and, with no Vice President for the remainder of his first
term, became concerned that his selection of a Secretary of State would
also constitute selection of his potential successor as President.2 6 He believed this was inconsistent with democratic principles and that the Presidency should be occupied by elected officials insofar as possible. 27 Thus,
21. Id. (emphasis added). The roots and development of this provision are discussed in
Part II of this Article. The omitted initial portion of the provision states: "In case of the
removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the
Congress may.. . ." Id.

There had been serious political and academic debate for several decades concerning
whether a Vice President who assumed the Presidency under this provision actually became
"President," thereby replacing an elected President who had become temporarily disabled, or
only served as "Acting President" until the disabled President recovered. This matter was
resolved by the Twenty-fifth Amendment which makes it clear that a disabled President may
recover the office when the disability is removed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; see also supra
note 17 and accompanying text; Emperor,supra note 13, at 1397-98.
22. Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239-41.
23. Id. § 9; see also RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 113 (1951).
24. Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealing 13 Rev. Stat. §§ 146-50 (1873)).
25. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 7015 (1945); SILVA, supra note 23, at 25-27.
26. See 93 CONG. REc. 7692 (1947) (President Truman's Special Message to Congress on
June 19, 1945).
27. Id.

Fall 1992]

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

111

he recommended that the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
pro tempore once again be placed at the head of the line of succession, to
be followed by the cabinet members. 28 Truman renewed this request in
each of the next two years,2 9 and the Congress finally adopted his suggestions-after debating whether succession by congressional officers is constitutional,30 what constitutes a disability,31 whether to extend succession
below the Cabinet to include senior military officers, 32 and whether the
Senate leadership should precede that of the House.3 3
The product of that debate, the current embodiment of the power
entrusted to Congress by Article II, appears in 3 U.S.C. § 19:
(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice
President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, upon
his resignation as Speaker and as a Representative in Congress, act
as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation,
removal from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a
Speaker is to begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the
office of President, there is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President pro tempore and as
Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of this section shall continue to act until the expiration
of the then current Presidential term, except that (1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded
in whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and
the Vice President-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a
President or Vice President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded
in whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he shall act only until the removal of the disability of
one of such individuals.
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to
act as President under subsection (b) of this section, then the officer
of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is
28. Id.
29. See H.R. Doc. No. 385, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1946); 93 CoNG. REc. 7693 (1947).

30.
31.
32.
33.

See,
See,
See,
See,

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

93 CONG. REc. 7766-70 (1947).
id. at 7796-98.
id. at 7598.
id. at 7780.
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not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office
of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of
the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of
the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Resources, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of
Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans' Affairs.
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall
continue so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after a qualified and prior-entitledindividual is
able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) of this subsection
or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual higher on such
list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the
list in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute
his resignation from the office by virtue of the holding of which he
qualified to act as President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to
such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior
to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability,
or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at
the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve
upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under
this section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by
law in the case of the President.34
Under subsection (a)(1) of this statute, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives is first in the line of succession to become Acting President if there is neither a President nor a Vice President who is able to
serve. 35 If there is no Speaker, or the Speaker is unable or unwilling to
act as President, subsection (b) empowers the President pro tempore of
the Senate to succeed and become Acting President. 36 In order to become Acting President, because there is neither a functioning President
nor Vice President, the Speaker of the House and the President pro
tempore of the Senate are required by section 19 to resign from their
34. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1988) (emphasis added). This provision, entitled "Vacancy in offices of
both President and Vice President; officers eligible to act," was enacted in 1948 and was preceded by succession acts of 1792 and 1886. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
35. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1). It is important to note that the statute uses the same term that
appears in the Article II provision of the Constitution on which it is based and empowers the
identified officials to "act" as President.
36. 3 U.S.C. § 19(b).
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respective leadership positions and from the Congress. 7
If neither a Speaker nor a President pro tempore is able or willing to
do so, then the members of the Cabinet are eligible to succeed and become Acting President under subsection (d) in the following order of
priority, corresponding to the order in which the positions were originally established:
Secretary of State,
Secretary of Treasury,
Secretary of Defense,
Attorney General,
Secretary of Interior,
Secretary of Agriculture,
Secretary of Commerce,
Secretary of Labor,
Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
Secretary of Transportation,
Secretary of Energy,
Secretary of Education,
Secretary of Veterans Affairs.38
Section 19 does not require that the congressional officers take the
presidential oath of office, although it appears from the legislative history
of the provision that this was expected to occur. 39 In any event, the statute explicitly refers to the taking of the presidential oath of office by a
cabinet member in order to become Acting President and specifies that
the oath-taking constitutes a resignation from the cabinet position.'
Either of the congressional officers is empowered to remain as Acting President, under subsection (c), until the end of the presidential term,
or until the relevant disqualification or disability on the part of the President or Vice President is removed. 41 By contrast, however, a cabinet
37. 3 U.S.C. §§ 19(a)(1), (b). Prior to 1945, Congress clearly intended that an official who
succeeded to the Presidency under Article II would retain the legislative or executive office
that entitled the official to succeed in the first instance. This was because it was believed that a
resignation from the office that was the basis for the succession would render the individual no
longer eligible for the Presidency since the individual would no longer be an "officer of the
United States" as required by Article II. See, eg., SILVA, supra note 23, at 138-42, 175.
38. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (1988), as most recently amended by the Department of Veterans
Affairs Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, § 13(a), 102 Stat. 2643 (1988) (creating that Department and
inserting the new Secretary into the succession statute). For a more complete discussion of the
evolution of this line of succession, see Emperor,supra note 13, at 1431 n.143.
39. The explicit requirement may have been omitted as a result of a misconception regarding the contents of a House amendment to the succession proposal. See 93 CONG. REc. 7695
(1947) (remarks of Sen. Wherry).
40. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(3).
41. 3 U.S.C. § 19(c). The Constitution, by way of qualifications, requires that the President and Vice President be natural born citizens of the United States, at least thirty-five years

114

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 20:105

officer who succeeds to the Presidency may serve as Acting President
under section 19 until the expiration of the presidential term or until any
disability or disqualification on the part of a "prior-entitled" individual is
removed.42
C. Congressional Supplantation
The reference to a "prior-entitled individual" specifically excludes
another cabinet officer who might occupy a position higher in the succession list established by the statute but who was unable, unwilling, or unavailable to assume the position in the assigned order of succession.4 3
The legislative history of the provision makes clear, however, that the
reference was intended by Congress to empower not only a President or
Vice President, but also a Speaker of the House or President pro tempore
of the Senate to remove and replace a former cabinet officer who has
become Acting President.' This discretionary supplantation authority
remains despite the fact that these "prior-entitled" individuals initially
might have been unable or, especially relevant in the case of the congressional officers, unwilling to function as Acting President.4 5
Under the provisions of section 19 requiring a resignation in order
to succeed,4 6 a refusal by these congressional officers to resign from the
Congress and their leadership position as required by the statute would
constitute a form of disqualification to act as President. These officers,
however, may decline to assume the Presidency when the choice first
becomes available, yet subsequently "remove" that disqualification and
qualify to act as President by complying with the law and submitting the
required resignation.4 7 Removal of the disqualification then would entiof age, residents of the United States for at least fourteen years, and inhabitants of different
states. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see also id. amend. XII. While the authority to provide
for succession in the event of death, disability, removal, or resignation, appears in Article II, as
explained earlier, see supra note 20 and accompanying text, the power of Congress to enact a
law providing for succession where there is a failure to meet the specified qualifications was
added to the Constitution in 1933 as part of the 20th Amendment. See THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1575 (1973).
42. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).
43. Id.
44. See 93 CONG. REC. 7705, 7774-76 (1947) (colloquies between Sens. Wherry and Barkley); see also id. at 7700 (remarks of Sen. Wherry); S. REP. No. 34, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1947) (explaining intent that the Speaker or President pro tempore could supplant a former
cabinet officer who is acting as President at such time as the congressional officers are no
longer disqualified); H.R. REP. No. 817, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1947) (describing ability of
"prior entitled individuals" to replace cabinet officer as Acting President).
45. See 93 CONG. REc. 7705 (1947).
46. 3 U.S.C. §§ 19 (a)(1), (b)(1).
47. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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tle either of the congressional officers, as "prior-entitled" individuals, to
assert a claim to the acting Presidency that would be superior under the
law to that of an individual who had resigned from a cabinet post and
become Acting President previously.4" Thus, a congressional officer
would hold the power under section 19 to displace at any time a former
cabinet member who had become Acting President.49
Furthermore, this option to replace an Acting President would be
available to any individual who may subsequently be selected as Speaker
of the House or President pro tempore of the Senate during the remainder of the presidential term.50 Because of the absence of factual or temporal limitations in section 19, it would not matter whether the
individual involved previously had declined to accept the position of Acting President, occupied either of the congressional leadership positions at
the time the cabinet member became Acting President, or even had been
a member of Congress when previous congressional officers originally
had decided to refuse to accept the office.51 And this threat of displacement would endure throughout the tenure, perhaps encompassing almost
the entire four-year presidential term if the vacancies occurred early in
the administration of an Acting President who had acceded to that position from the Cabinet.
The potential for displacing a cabinet officer acting as President,
even with a newly elected congressional officer, was well within the intent
of Congress when it enacted this provision.52 This was made absolutely
clear in an explanation provided by Senator Wherry, a leading proponent
of the legislation, during the floor discussion of the bill that eventually
became section 19:
Mr. BARKLEY. [I]f the House should elect an unqualified
Speaker, and if the Senate should elect an unqualified President pro
tempore, neither of them could become President?
Mr. WHERRY. It would then go to the Secretary of State.
This is exactly correct.
Mr. BARKLEY. Then the succession would finally pass to
the Secretary, as the third in line?
48. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 45.
50. See supra note 45.
51. Strangely enough, the Constitution does not require that a Speaker of the House of
Representatives be a member of that body. It simply empowers the House to "chuse their
Speaker" but provides no standards or qualifications for being elected to that position. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; see also 93 CONG. REc. 7780 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Russell, arguing
that the Senate President pro tempore should come before the Speaker of the House in the line
of succession).
52. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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Mr. WHERRY. Yes, [the cabinet officer could succeed] temporarily, only, because it would take but a very few minutes for the
House to elect a new Speaker if the Speaker did not qualify or if he
resigned. The Senate could do the same thing with the President
pro tempore; or, if he did not qualify, then the Secretary of State
could continue to act as President until the President pro tempore
qualified.
Mr. BARKLEY. He could be President, then, for a few minutes and then the House would unhorse him?
Mr. WHERRY. He would serve only for the emergency. 3
It is patent from this exchange and other references in the legislative
history of section 19"4 that Congress intended to preserve authority for
its leaders to "unhorse" a cabinet member who becomes Acting
President.
While a preference for elected officials in the line of succession is
consistent with the wishes of President Harry Truman in 1945 when he
proposed revision of the predecessor to section 19, the supplantation provision goes too far by providing the Congress with inordinate power over
the tenure of an Acting President.55 For example, so long as it remains
unclear whether a disabled President and Vice President will recover, the
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore may postpone their succession decisions in order to avoid the permanent loss of their legislative
positions for what may be a temporary stay in the Oval Office. Rather
than taking the likely irreversible step of resigning from their leadership
and congressional positions, they would lose nothing by refusing the opportunity to serve as Acting President and allowing a cabinet officer to
take the post while there is any question of longevity. Subsequently, if
and when the disabled President and Vice President die or have been
53. 93 CONG. REC. 7705 (1947). This logic was premised on the presumption, apparently
widely shared in the Senate and the House, that elected officials from the Congress have a
superior claim to the Presidency than does any appointed, unelected cabinet official. See, e.g.,
93 CONG. REC. 7777-78 (1947) (Sen. Baldwin); id. at 8633 (Rep. Keating); see also S. REP. No.
34, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947) (explaining intent that the Speaker or President pro tempore
could supplant a former cabinet officer who is acting as President at such time as the congressional officers are no longer disqualified); H.R. REP. No. 817, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1947)
(describing ability of "prior entitled individuals" to replace cabinet officer as Acting President); 93 CONG. REc. 7774-76 (1947) (colloquies between Sens. Wherry and Barkley); id. at
7700 (remarks of Sen. Wherry).
54. 93 CONG. REc. 7700 (1947).
55. The first version of successor legislation submitted by President Truman specifically
authorized a cabinet officer to serve as Acting President only until a qualified legislative officer
could take over or a new President could be elected during the next congressional election. See
Emperor, supra note 13, at 1417-30 for a full discussion of the succession acts of 1792 and 1886
and the development of § 19 during the Truman Administration.
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determined to be disabled permanently, the congressional leaders would
retain unbridled discretion to determine whether, when, and on what
political or other basis to remove and replace an Acting President who
has been drawn from the Cabinet. 6
D. Section 19 in Action: A Hypothetical
The insidious effects of these provisions can best be illustrated by
utilizing real personalities and potential circumstances. Assume, hypothetically, that Vice President Quayle actually had given truth to the rumors that swirled around the nation during July 1992 and had resigned
under pressure to enhance President Bush's chances for reelection. Also
assume that later the same day, while in Kennebunkport preparing to
announce the nomination of Ronald Reagan as interim Vice President
under the Twenty-fifth Amendment, President Bush was seriously injured and rendered comatose while attempting a 180-degree turn in his
cigarette speedboat.
Speaker of the House Thomas Foley would have the option of resigning from his office and the Congress in order to become Acting President. With an election approaching, however, Speaker Foley might
reasonably decide that the loss of his hard-earned position in the House
was not warranted for a four-month stint as Acting President in a Republican administration. Senate President pro tempore Robert Byrd
would next be faced with the same decision. Again, it would not be unreasonable for the powerful chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee to decide that his vow to bring a billion dollars worth of federal
projects to his home state of West Virginia would be easier to satisfy if he
remained in the Senate for the duration of his term.
Thus, the statutory line of cabinet member succession would be activated. Assume further that Secretary of State James Baker already had
left that position to become Chief of Staff in the White House, that Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady had resigned to devote full time to fundraising efforts for President Bush, and that Secretary of Defense
56. The only apparent constraint on this discretionary authority lies in the Acting President's ability to appoint an individual to fill the vice-presidential vacancy under § 2 of the 25th
Amendment. Even as Acting President, the former cabinet officer would have this and all the
powers of an actual President and would not be automatically displaced by the new Vice President. See, eg., Emperor, supra note 13, at 1405 n.60. And the new Vice President, once
nominated and confirmed by both houses of Congress as provided in that section, would be the
primary successor to the Presidency if anything, such as "removal" by the congressional leadership, were to happen to the Acting President. See id. at 1442-43; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XXV, § 1. Of course, the congressional leadership could take steps, including a preemptive supplantation of the Acting President, to delay or avoid congressional confirmation of
a vice-presidential nominee.
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Richard Cheney was on a backpacking trip to the outermost reaches of
the Wyoming wilderness and, by deliberate design on his part, could not
be reached for twelve hours. Since it can be safely assumed that the
Democratically-controlled Congress would have no intention of quickly
approving an interim Vice President, this chain of events would bring the
choice to Attorney General William Barr. Finally, assume the Attorney
General chose not to wait for Secretary Cheney's return but eagerly accepted the opportunity to become the youngest Acting President in the
nation's history in order, however briefly, to further protect and enhance
the presidential prerogatives he had defended so vigorously at the Justice
Department.
Shortly after taking the presidential oath of office, Acting President
Barr is told that Secretary Cheney is on the telephone and wishes, at the
urging of his staff and as a matter of duty to his country, to assert his
more senior claim to the Presidency. Armed with the advice of the Justice Department, Mr. Barr explains to Mr. Cheney that "the train has
left the station" and that there is no basis under section 19 for Mr. Barr
to relinquish the position to Mr. Cheney. Mr. Cheney returns, perhaps
only slightly disappointed, to the beauties of the outlands.
Soon, a second call is received by the Acting President. It is Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez who reports that he has prevailed upon
Congressman Foley to step down from the Speakership for the few weeks
remaining in the congressional session, based on assurances that Mr. Foley will be reelected to the Speakership of the new Congress if the Democrats maintain their control. Further, as part of these machinations, his
Democratic colleagues have elected Congressman Gonzalez the new
Speaker as a gesture of respect for his continuing badgering of the Bush
Administration with regards to its policies toward Iraq.
Speaker Gonzalez politely reminds the Acting President of his refusal, while Attorney General, to provide additional classified information requested for the Congressman's investigation after the
Congressman had been accused of disclosing such information in the
Congressional Record.57 The new Speaker also recalls the former Attorney General's previous decision not to appoint an independent counsel as
requested by Democratic members of Congress to investigate allegations
that Bush Administration officials had broken the law in authorizing ex57. See, e.g., Press Release, House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs
(July 30, 1992) (describing letters from the Central Intelligence Agency as having "all the
appearance of warmed over versions of earlier complaints from Attorney General William P.
Barr").
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ports of American technology to Iraq.5" The new Speaker then subtly
refers to the supplantation provisions of section 19, suggests the Acting
President "look it up," and invites the Acting President to the Speaker's
office in the Capitol for a "frank discussion" of these two matters.
The Justice Department and White House Counsel's Office scurry to
examine the law and confirm the new Speaker's authority to supplant the
former Attorney General at the drop of a resignation from the Speakership. The Acting President begins to consider whether a few classified
documents and a mere investigation by an independent counsel are really
worth fighting over. Should Barr continue to refuse his "requests,"
Speaker Gonzalez could resign, become Acting President for the remainder of the presidential term, and direct the provision of all relevant documents to the Congress and the appointment of a particularly aggressive
independent counsel to look into Bush Administration "wrongdoing" in
the months leading up to the Fall election.
As this fanciful discourse illustrates, the unbridled discretion that
section 19 places in the hands of the congressional leadership may affect
the ability of an Acting President to base decisions on the best interests of
the nation rather than what would be most pleasing to the Congress.5 9 It
also provides a statutory mechanism for the removal of a "President"
that replaces the rigorous constitutional impeachment standards of a trial
and two-thirds vote of the Senate' with the whimsy of a single member
of Congress. Whether this arrangement is consistent with the Constitution requires an examination of the original intent of the Framers in
drafting the constitutional provision that authorizes section 19 as well as
evolving principles of separation of powers between the Congress and the
Executive.
II.

The Framer's Intent: The Constitutionality of Section 19
Under Article II

It is important to examine at the outset the constitutional framework within which Congress may enact a succession provision in the first
place. The premise of the entire constitutional structure is the separation
58. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, In Switch, Democratsto Seek Extension of Independent
Counsel Statute, WASH. PosT, Aug. 15, 1992, at A5.
59. That this type of executive-legislative relationship was abhorrent to the Founders
should be self-evident. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776)
(including among the charges assigned to the King of Great Britain that "He has made judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of
their Salaries."); THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that executive independence is essential).
60. See U.S. CONT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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of powers. The central role of this concept was described by James
Madison, who, it will be seen, also played a large role in crafting the
Article II language under which section 19 was enacted:
It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging to
one of the [branches] ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other[s]. It is equally evident that none
of them ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective powers ....

Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of
these [branches] in the constitution of the government, and to trust
to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of
power?
...

[E]xperience assures us that the efficacy of the provision

has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is
indispensably necessary for the more feeble against the more powerful members of the government. The legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all
power into its impetuous vortex.6 '
The Founders' overriding concern with the potential for legislative domination, at the expense of what was viewed then as a "feeble" Executive,
forms an essential backdrop for assessing the extent to which section 19
is consistent with the intent of Article II.
The constitutionality of the supplantation provision of section 19 as
enacted by Congress under Article II depends upon the general intent of
the drafters of that provision of the Constitution and the specific status
they intended for an "officer," in this case a cabinet official, who succeeds
to the position of Acting President established by the Constitution.6 2
Since the only means provided in the Constitution for removing an actual
President are impeachment or compliance with the complex disability
removal provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, a statute that contemplates removal by lesser means of an official who was intended to
61. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison). The precise standards that have been
adopted by the Supreme Court to resolve separation of powers disputes between the branches
are explained in greater detail in Part III of this Article.
62. See, eg., SILVA, supra note 23, at 2. The question was posed in constitutional terms as
"Must one actually become the President in order to 'exercise the Office of President of the
United States' [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5], or to 'act as President' [U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1,
cl. 5], or to 'discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office' [U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
5]." The author of that book believed the answer to be that "generally, all agree that a designated officer under a succession statute does not actually become President as does the Vice
President by practice." Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 88 n.l1. See Emperor,supra note
13, at 1397-98, for a discussion of how the latter "practice" developed. The 25th Amendment
eliminated any doubt as to the presidential status of a Vice President who assumes the vacant
office. Id. at 1401-02 n.48.
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have the same status under the Constitution as an actual President would
not be consistent with the constitutional framework.6 3 On the other
hand, if an Acting President under Article II and section 19 was intended to be treated as something less than an actual President, lesser
means for removal may be constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the Framers as to both the scope of Congress's power
and the status of a statutory successor is evidenced by the records of the
debates at the Constitutional Convention that resulted in the language of
Article II. A review of those discussions indicates a clear recognition of
the desirability of an appropriate provision for succession in the event a
President were to become incapable of functioning properly." This desire was coupled with an apparent, albeit indirectly expressed, intention
that a non-elected successor to the Presidency in such circumstances be
temporary in nature and an acting, rather than an actual, President.6"
In addition, there was a pervasive insistence that the chief executive must
be shielded from the overweening power of the Congress. 66 Thus, the
debates intertwine explanations of the need for a proper mechanism for
removing and replacing an incapable President with discussions concerning the dangers of having a President who is overly dependent upon the
Congress for continued tenure.
A. The Pinckney Plan
Several written proposals were submitted to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 for consideration at the outset of its efforts to fulfill its
charge to revise the Articles of Confederation. Only the plan reported to
have been prepared by Charles Pinckney included a provision for presidential succession. 6 Article I, section 8 of the Pinckney Plan stated with
regard to the Chief Executive that:
63. The impeachment power and the standards for its exercise are set out in Article II,
§ 4, while the congressional role in impeachment is described in Article I, § 2, clause 5, and
Article I, § 3, clauses 6 & 7.
64. See infra notes 68-73, 86, 94, 96, 100-01 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 75, 86-87, 94, 96-98, 101 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 73, 76-84, 87, 89, 95, 102 and accompanying text.
67. See, ag., infra notes 70, 75 and accompanying text.
68. See SILVA, supra note 23, at 4. The submission of this "Pinckney Plan" was claimed
by Pinckney himself in a December 30, 1818 letter to Secretary of State John Quincy Adams.

The authenticity of this claim has been the subject of some controversy, however. See, e.g.,
THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES: (Gaillard Hunt & James B. Scott eds., 1920) [hereinafter DEBATES];
see also CHARLES C. NoTT, THE MYSTERY OF THE PINCKNEY DRAUGHT (1908) (supporting
Pinckney's claim); JOHN F. JAMESON, 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE YEAR 1902, at 89 (1903) (opposing Pinckney's claim).
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In case of his removal, death, resignation, or disability, the
President of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until
another President be chosen-and in case of the death of the President
of the Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do
69
SO.

This provision indicates early recognition of (1) the wisdom of providing
for a vacancy in the Presidency, (2) the acceptability of a temporary successor to fill such a vacancy, and (3) the lack of conceptual difficulty with
including congressional officers in the line of succession.
The first actual discussions of succession-related issues that appear
in the records of the Convention occurred during its earliest days in June
1787.70 On June 1, Gunning Bedford of Delaware opposed giving the
President a seven-year term because of the problems that would result if,
during such a lengthy period, the President should "not possess the qual' 71
ifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment."
Impeachment, he explained, would not be available since it was intended
to reach malfeasance, not incapacity. 72 The next day, George Mason of
Virginia argued that an unfit President should be removable but opposed
"making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation
73
of the fundamental principle of good Government.
B. The Hamilton Plan
Alexander Hamilton of New York presented his now famous monarchical plan to establish a President-for-life on June 18.7 Again, the
concern for succession was illustrated by Hamilton's inclusion of a provision that "on the death, resignation or removal of the [President,] his
authorities.., be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor
69. See SILVA, supra note 23, at 4 n.6 (citing 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 600 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]).
It is noteworthy that congressional officers were included in this seminal version of the
succession provision. The original Succession Act of 1792, enacted by the second Congress
which included many of the Framers of the Constitution, also provided for succession by the
congressional leadership. See 24 Stat. 1 (1886). Thus, the constitutional issue is not the mere
potential for congressional officers to succeed to the Presidency, but only their ability to supplant or exert undue influence over an Acting President. See Emperor,supra note 13, at 142426 and accompanying footnotes for a full discussion of the issues concerning the constitutionality of congressional succession to the Presidency; see also SILVA, supra note 23, at 133-37;
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (according substantial weight to constitutional
interpretations of the early Congresses).
70. See DEBATES, supra note 68, at 40-41.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 46.
74. Id. at 116-18.
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be appointed." 75
C.

The Morris-Madison Dialogue

No further discussion of the questions of succession and overreaching by the legislature is recorded until July 17. Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania expressed his strong opposition on that date to any arrangement that would allow the legislature to select the President:
He will be the mere creature of the Legislature: if appointed
and impeachable by that body. ... If the Legislature elect, it will
be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the
election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely
be the title to the appointment.
... If the Executive be chosen by the National Legislature, he
will not be independent [of] it; and if not independent, usurpation
and tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the
consequence.76
James Madison concurred, emphasizing that it was essential to the
separation of powers principle, which he and the other delegates believed
in so firmly, that the branches of the new government should be truly
independent." They already had agreed, he reminded the delegates, that
judges should be life-tenured in order that they would not be dependent
on the legislature for reappointment and "thus render the Legislature the
virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws."' 78 It was even more
important, he later urged, that the Executive and the congressional powers be kept separate and independent.7 9
On July 19, Gouverneur Morris again focused on the potential dangers of the impeachment power, arguing that it would hold the President
"in such dependence that he will be no check on the Legislature, will not
be a firm guardian of the people and of the public interest [but] will be
the tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the Legislature." 80
Madison answered the next day, insisting that any proposal to create a
"chief Magistrate" who would play a significant role in the new government must be coupled with some means for protecting the nation against
the continuation in that office of an individual who was incapacitated,
negligent, or dishonest.8 Charles Pinckney responded that impeach-

75. DEBATES, supra note 68, at 119.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 267, 269.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 291.
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ment was unnecessary and should not issue from the legislature since it
would be used "as a rod over the Executive and by that means effectively
destroy his independence." 82
Again on the twenty-first, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth of July,
Morris and Madison turned the debates to the dangers of a weak executive who would hold office at the sufferance of the legislature. Madison
noted that the experience of "all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex" and suggested that this was "the real source of danger" to an American
constitution. 3 Morris hammered at the theme of a sinister legislature
that would engulf the executive if not sufficiently bounded:
Much has been said of the intrigues that will be practiced by the
Executive to get into office. Nothing has been said on the other
side of the intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of [a]
party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration,
will 84
cabal with the Legislature till he succeeds in supplanting
him.
Clearly, the image of a President overly beholden to the Congress was a
constant source of concern to these delegates.
D. Committee of Detail Draft
The first fruit of the debates was returned to the delegates in early
August as a draft constitution prepared by the Committee of Detail. 5
Article X, section 2 of that draft provided that the President could be
removed from office on impeachment by the House and conviction in the
Supreme Court and that,
In case of his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the President of the
Senate shall exercise those powers and duties until another President of the United States
be chosen, or until the disability of the
86
President be removed.
The draft provided for legislative selection of the President. Delegate James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued in favor of a joint ballot involving both Houses of Congress since "[d]isputes between the two
Houses during and concerning the vacancy of the Executive might have
82. Id. But see iL at 293 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris on July 20, 1787).
83. DEBATES, supra note 68, at 295-96.
84. Id. at 315-16; see also id. at 318-24 (concerning the potential for foreign powers to
influence the selection of a President if the selection power were to be vested in the legislature).
85. Id. at 337-46.
86. Id. at 343. Article V, § 4 of the Committee of Detail draft provided the Senate with
the power to "chuse" its own President and other officers. Id. at 339.
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dangerous consequences."" 7 Gouverneur Morris continued to argue
against an overly powerful legislature and for electors from the several
states instead:
If the Legislature have the Executive dependent on them, they can
perpetuate and support their usurpations .... Cabal and corruption are attached to that mode of election .... Hence the Executive
is interested in Courting popularity in the Legislature by sacrificing
his Executive Rights .... [R]ivals would be continually intriguing
to oust the President from his place.8"
James Madison also was troubled by the prospects for intrigue that
might follow from entrusting the Senate with both the responsibility for
choosing a new President and the power to designate successors. This
would tempt the Senate to delay appointing a new President while one of
their number, the President of the Senate, held the Presidency and thus
controlled the veto power.8 9 He believed that executive powers should be
exercised during any presidential vacancy by a Council to the President
that would consist of the President of the Senate, Speaker of the House,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the members of the Cabinet.9 0
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina concluded that the legislature
should have the power to decide who would be successors to the President and moved that consideration of the last clause of the provisionspecifying that the President of the Senate would assume those dutiesbe postponed. 91 This motion was seconded by John Dickinson of Delaware who believed the language of the draft was too vague because it did
not define the term "disability" or indicate who would be responsible for
92
determining when it existed.
E. The Committee of Eleven Revision
The decisions of the delegates concerning the Committee of Detail
draft were entrusted to the Committee of Eleven which reported a further draft on September 4, 1787. 91 The first and third sections of Article
X of that draft provided for a four-year presidential term, an electoral
college, and a Vice President who would preside over the Senate except
during trials on impeachment of the President. The second section contained a revised succession provision:
87. DEBATES, supra note 68, at 347.

88. Id. at 463; see also id. at 472 (On August 27, Morris objected to the President of the
Senate being identified as the President's successor and suggested the Chief Justice instead.).
89. Id. at 472.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also 2 RECORDS, supra note 69, at 535.
92. DEBATES, supra note 68, at 472.

93. Id. at 506-08.
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[The President]... shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the
Senate, for Treason, or bribery, and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the vice-president shall exercise those
powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the
inability of the President be removed.94
These alterations did not allay the fears regarding an executive
whose fate was tied too closely to the Congress. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, for example, believed that empowering the Senate to select a
President from the electoral college candidates was very dangerous and
that the individual selected would "not be the man of the people as he
ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate." 95
Others also were dissatisfied with the new succession language. Edmund Randolph of Virginia moved to separate it from the impeachment
power and substitute a provision that proved to be very close to the final
version: "The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United
States shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability
of the President and Vice President; and such officer shall act accordingly
until the time of electing a President shall arrive." 9 6

F. Madison Molds the Succession
James Madison pointed out that the last clause of Randolph's proposal would empower an Acting President to serve until the end of an
unexpired presidential term and would preclude the possibility of an intermediate special election of a new President. 97 Accordingly, he moved
to revise the clause to empower the successor to serve "until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." 9' Gouverneur Morris
seconded the motion and the amended section was approved by the
delegates. 99
94. DEBATES, supra note 68, at 508.
95. Id. at 519.
96. Id. at 525.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 324. Some delegates objected, without effect, to the difficulty of holding a special election or to limiting the legislature to temporary appointments, while others believed the
range of potential successors should not be limited to federal officers. Id. at 525-26. In further
discussion of the third section of the Article, Morris objected to the Vice President presiding
over the Senate since, in his view, this would be tantamount to giving the Executive the power
to control the Senate. Id. at 527. Roger Sherman of Connecticut assured Morris that there
was no danger from this arrangement. Further, if the Vice President was not given this function, he would be "without employment" and a member of the Senate would be required to
give up his vote to be the presiding officer. Id.
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G. The Final Version
The final draft of the now rapidly emerging Constitution was returned to the delegates in the Report of the Committee of Stile and Arrangement which had been charged with ensuring that the text was
accurate and consistent with the decisions of the delegates. The relevant
provision of this draft was essentially the same as the current Article II,
section 1,clause 6, except that the final clause stated that a presidential
successor could serve until a disability was removed or "the period for
choosing another President arrive." 100 Presumably through the efforts
of James Madison, who had raised the desirability of special elections
previously, the clause was altered to read "or a president shall be
elected" before the final version of the Constitution was produced and
offered to the states for ratification. 10 1
A further illustration of the sensitivity of the drafters to the problem
of creating a President who is too dependent upon the Congress appeared
near the end of the Convention in reaction to a motion by John Rutledge
of South Carolina and Gouverneur Morris to add a provision that would
suspend impeached officials from their positions until after they had been
tried and acquitted. James Madison objected that the impeachment
power requiring action by the two houses already threatened to make the
President too dependent upon Congress. Allowing the House to effect
the President's suspension merely by voting for impeachment would
place him at the mercy of Congress, which could remove him temporarily "in order to make way for the functions of another who will be more
favorable to their views." 10 2 The motion was defeated.
This examination of the records of the Constitutional Convention
distills several points within the succession framework. First, the Framers intended that any successor, whether a Vice President or another offi100. Id. at 550.
101. The issue of succession appears to have been discussed further only in the Virginia
Ratification Convention. There, George Mason, one of the few delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who refused to sign the final version, raised an objection because the proposed
constitution included no provision for speedy election of a new President in the event of an
unexpected vacancy. James Madison responded by underscoring the temporary status intended for an Acting President and explaining that he expected an immediate election would
be called if both the President and Vice President were to die. In any event, Congress could
only provide for a successor to serve until the next regularly scheduled election. See SILVA,
supra note 23, at 11.
The Federalist Papers, produced to promote the proposed constitution and inform the
ratification process, also mention succession only once in passing by describing the Vice President as a potential "substitute for the President." THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander
Hamilton).
102. DEBATES, supra note 68, at 561.
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cial designated by Congress, should "act" as President temporarily until
the elected President was again able to serve or a special election could be
held to select a new President.1" 3 John Tyler established by practice, and
the Twenty-fifth Amendment now establishes by law, that the Vice President actually becomes President when the Presidency is vacant. 1° 4
Neither practice nor law, however, has altered the constitutionally temporary status of a congressional or cabinet official who has become Acting President under a statute-currently 3 U.S.C § 19-enacted by the
Congress under Article II.10
Since such an official who becomes Acting President is merely exercising the powers and performing the duties of the office and is not actually President, it can reasonably be argued that removal of an Acting
President by means other than impeachment would not violate the Constitution. 10 6 This conclusion as to the lesser status of an Acting President
is supported by the fact that the Constitution continues to leave room in
Article II for the calling of a special election to select a new President.
This, of course, would not be permitted in the case of an actual President.
Thus, the provision empowering senior legislative officers to displace a
cabinet officer who has become Acting President does not violate the
constitutional framework for succession intended under Article II, section 1, clause 6.
103. See, e.g., SiLVA, supra note 23, at 8-9.
104. See Emperor,supra note 13, at 1397-98, 1402; see also SILVA, supra note 23, at 30-31;
(stating that the acceptance of a succeeding Vice President as an actual, not Acting, President
(prior to the Twenty-fifth Amendment) was "doubtless contrary" to the intent of the
Framers).
105. See, e.g., the extreme view of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1856 in S. REP. No.
260, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1856). ("Such an official is only a contingent functionary, with
presidential authority of a provisional character confined to a sphere of limited and prescribed
duties. The acting officer has not devolved upon him the powers and duties of an elected
President, according to the provisions of the Constitution, but can only serve for a limited term
and with a prescribed purpose."); see also 13 CONG. REc. 192 (1881). Others, however, argue
that Congress does not have the power to subject such an acting official to the instability of
calling a special election before the end of the unexpired term. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONS TTuriON OF THE UNITED STATES 336-37 (Ist ed. 1833); see also CONG.

GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 691-92 (remarks of Rep. Boutwell).
106. See, e.g., SILVA, supra note 23, at 150. But see id. at 175 (doubtful that Article II
empowers Congress to designate more than one qualified successor at any given time). For
example, the language of Article II, § 1, clause 6 continues to allow for the calling of a special
election to elect a new President. Whether such an election would result in a full four year
term and alteration of the schedule for presidential elections thereafter remains to be determined. But see id. at 50 (explaining that the Constitution requires that both the President and
Vice President be elected at the same time and that any newly elected President and Vice
President must serve for a full four year term, not merely the remainder of the unexpired
term).
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Second, however, the records of the Constitutional Convention present vivid evidence of the Framers' abhorrence of any process that would
cleave the fine lines of separated powers they crafted and create a chief
executive officer whose continued tenure in office would be wholly and
directly dependent upon the sufferance of the legislature. Their experience with the flaws of human character necessitated their tolerance for a
carefully structured impeachment process. Principles of good government compelled them to allow for special elections to select a new President. Nonetheless, it remains doubtful that even the specter of
simultaneous vacancies in the Presidency and the Vice Presidency would
have moved them to accept a legal framework where the congressional
leadership could so clearly impinge upon the independent judgment and
tenure of a person acting as President."0 7
As already explained, the delegates agreed to allow an Acting President to be replaced by special election and thereby be denied the same
protection from abrupt removal that the Constitution provides an elected
President. While Madison and others acquiesced in this electoral exception to executive stability, their express concerns at the Convention indicate they clearly would have seen the threat to independence inherent in
the congressional supplantation power of section 19.108 It would be difficult to believe that they would not agree that the integrity of the constitutional system itself may be so threatened by the potential consequences of
107. The exigencies presented by a crisis of this nature may, of course, lead some to accept
measures that would otherwise be unpalatable. For example, the potential devastation of the
District of Columbia by a nuclear attack led the Senate at least to discuss the option of extending the line of succession through the ranks of the military as well. See 93 CoNG. REC.
7598, 7784-85 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Wiley).
108. The general concession to electoral decision-making is also fundamental to our system
of government. See, eg., infra text accompanying note 132. There is no separation of power
issue when the voters, as opposed to single members of Congress, possess the authority to
decide who should become President. Thus, the potential for Congress to end an Acting President's tenure by calling for a special election as provided in Article II, § 1, clause 6 is consistent with the constitutional principles under discussion here and provides for a more orderly
and publicly acceptable means to effect change in the Presidency.
Sensitivity to the erosion of presidential independence is reflected in Madison's statements
during the 1789 debate in the First Congress regarding a proposal that would require Senate
advice and consent for the President to remove the Secretary of State:
Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more plausibly
grounded against the Constitution, under which we are now deliberating, than that
founded on the mingling of the executive and legislative branches of the Government
in one body. It has been objected that the Senate have too much of the executive
power even by having a control over the President in the appointment to office.
Now, shall we extend this connection between the Legislative and executive departments, which will strengthen the objection, and diminish the responsibility we have
in the head of the Executive?
I ANNALS OF CONG. 380 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
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this congressional power to remove an Acting President by means other
than special election or impeachment that such a power cannot be tolerated as a matter of constitutional law.1" 9 This conclusion is confirmed by
applying the principles of separation of powers analysis that have been
elaborated by the Supreme Court since the ratification of the
Constitution.
III.
A.

Maintaining the Separation of Powers

General Precepts

In explaining the concept of separated powers, the Supreme Court
has written:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the
new Federal Government into three defined categories, legislative,
executive, and judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each
branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,
even to accom110
plish desirable objectives, must be resisted.
James Madison, in arguing for the ratification of the proposed constitution following the end of the Constitutional Convention, wrote concerning the importance of maintaining the separation of powers, "No
political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with
the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty."' 1 At the same
time, however, he recognized that this principle, upon which so much of
the vitality of our system of government rests, did not require that the
branches "have no partialagency in, or no control over the acts of each
other.""' 2 Instead, "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted."" 3
The Supreme Court has restated these bedrock principles by holding
that, while there is no basis for mandating the branches to be entirely
109. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in
office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to
his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official
consequence.")
110. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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separate and distinct from one another," 4 the Constitution requires the
three branches to be "entirely free from the control or coercive influence,
direct or indirect, of either of the others." ' The practical dictates of
government demand that power be shared, not wholly separated, yet
there remains a point beyond which the branches cannot tread
without
11 6
upsetting the balance, even in the name of good government.
Madison, who keenly observed that the legislature has a tendency to
dominate a republican form of government, also wrote that the greatest
protection against "a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others."' 1 7 This tendency toward encroachment
has moved the Supreme Court to resist the tendency of each branch to
1 18
expand its power.
Separation of powers issues are subject to judicial scrutiny under
two tests that have been developed by the Supreme Court. 9 The first
test is whether the questioned action by one branch usurps the power or
responsibilities of another branch to such an extent that it reduces the
appropriate powers of one or inappropriately increases the powers of the
114. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443-44 (1977) (stating
that such a position would be "archaic" and upholding congressional vesting of control of
former Presidents' papers in the General Services Administrator).
115. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (not unconstitutional for
Congress to limit President's authority to remove Federal Trade Commission members to instances of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance).
116. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983). While it could, of course, be
argued that § 19 is not inconsistent with relevant separation of powers principles, the inhibiting effect that the congressional Sword of Damocles could have on an Acting President
strongly suggests otherwise. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 631-32 (referring to the "Damoces' sword" of potential removal of lesser officials by the President).
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 71, 73
(Alexander Hamilton) (legislature has tendency to absorb other government functions). It is
difficult to see what other checks and balances under the Constitution would come into play to
deter a congressional officer from seizing the Presidency if a cabinet officer proved to be uncompliant as Acting President. There are no veto opportunities relating to a succession decision that will be presented to an Acting President who may be threatened with such a
supplantation. Further, as illustrated in Part V of this Article, the prospects for judicial intervention in what may be reasonably characterized as a political dispute are by no means certain.
118. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122-23 (1976) (unconstitutional for Congress to grant
itself authority to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission).
119. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). But see
Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of PowersDisputes, 64 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 111-27 (1984) (arguing that the separation of powers decisions of the Court rest not
on a distinct analytical doctrine but on more traditional sources, i.e., the constitutional text,
the intent of the Framers, custom, and practice).
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other. 120 The second test is whether the action interferes with the performance of the constitutional functions of another branch and, if so,
whether the governmental objective sought to be achieved by the action
justifies the interference. 2 ' Applying these tests to the legislative supplantation provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 19 indicates apparent violations of
constitutional standards under both tests. 122
B.

Aggrandizement or Encroachment

The reasoning in Bowsher v. Synar 12 1 regarding the application of
the first test-erosion or aggrandizement of the powers of another
branch-to the statutory succession provisions is instructive. Bowsher
involved the question whether the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also known as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act,"' 2 4 violated separation of powers principles by empowering the
Comptroller General, who was removable by a joint resolution of Congress, to specify to the President the portions of the federal budget that
12
must be reduced to achieve spending ceilings. 1
The statute established a maximum deficit amount for federal spending for fiscal years 1986 through 1991 and was intended to eliminate the
deficit over that period. 1 26 If a fiscal year deficit exceeded the maximum
allowable amount, across-the-board spending cuts would be required to
meet the target levels.1 27 The directors of the Office of Management and
Budget and the Congressional Budget Office would submit estimates of
the federal deficit to the Comptroller General to be reported to the President who would be bound to order the reductions specified in the Comp120. Examples of cases where this aggrandizement or encroachment standard has been
invoked include Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 95152; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 119; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928). See Alan B. Morrison, A
Non-Power Looks at Separation of Powers, 79 GEo. L.J. 281, 284-91 (1990) (further dividing
these cases into "active" or "passive" encroachment situations).

121. Examples of cases involving this undue interference test include Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
122. Both tests were applied in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382-84 (1989)
(congressional vesting in the President of power to appoint and remove U.S. Sentencing Commission members does not impermissibly increase executive power or interfere with functions
of the judiciary).
123. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

124.
125.
126.
127.

Pub. L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 720.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 717-18.
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troller General's report. 2 ' Several members of Congress and members
of the National Treasury Employees Union challenged the constitutionality of this process. 12 9
The Supreme Court, quoting the district court, noted that the
Comptroller General had been assigned "executive functions," not legislative powers, under the Act. 130 It then affirmed the district court's decision that Congress constitutionally was barred from exercising the
general power to remove officials who perform "executive functions, except by impeachment."' 3 1 The Court quoted Madison and Montesquieu
to the effect that "there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same . . . body of magistrates," and observed that this principle is embodied in our system where the President
is responsible to the people rather than the Congress, subject only to the
impeachment process. 132 The Constitution, said the Court, "does not
contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers
charged with the execution of the laws it enacts."' 13 3 Apart from impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate, any direct congressional removal power over such officers is inconsistent with
separation of powers. 134 More specifically,
In light of [the Court's] precedents, we conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer
charged with the execution of the laws, except by impeachment.
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in
Congress control over the execution of the laws. As the District
Court observed, "Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him,
that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey."
135

Allowing a different result, said the Court, would effectively grant
Congress a legislative veto over matters within the scope of an executive
128. Id. at 718.
129. Id. at 719.
130. Id. at 720. The statute permitted direct appeal of the issue from the District Court to
the Supreme Court.
131. Id. at 726-27.
132. Id. at 721-22. And, of course, subject to the disability removal power of the 25th
Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 18.
133. Id. at 722.
134. Id. at 724 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926), which declared
unconstitutional a statute requiring Senate advice and consent for the removal of certain postmasters by the President). But see Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) (ruling
several officials performing executive functions but appointed by Philippine legislative officers
to be improper under the Philippine Organic Act).
135. Id. at 726 (citation omitted).
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officer's duties.13 6 In INS v. Chadha, the Court had previously invalidated a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that authorized either House of Congress to adopt a one-House, concurrent
resolution and overrule an executive branch decision under the statute to
allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States.1 37 The Court
had concluded that the constitutional requirements for both Houses to
act on laws, for presenting them to the President for approval, and for
the President to have a veto opportunity demanded that "the carefully
defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded" in order
138
to maintain the separation of powers.
Applying these principles in Bowsher, the Court found that the
harm of allowing congressional removal of executive officials flows from
the executive official's subservient position and "presumed desire" to
avoid removal by acting in ways pleasing to Congress.1 39 Thus, it was
unreasonable to argue that a provision for removal cannot be challenged
until it is actually used. 1" Accordingly, the National Treasury Employee's Union, which had filed a companion suit to that brought by
members of Congress and whose members would be denied a scheduled
increase in employment benefits by proposed budget cuts, had standing
to bring a constitutional challenge to the Act. 141 It is important to note
that theprospect of harm that could result from the potential reticence of
the official performing executive functions was sufficient in Bowsher to
support the initiation and successful prosecution of a suit for corrective
judicial intervention to invalidate the offending provisions of the law.
C. Impermissible Interference
The second test-balancing impermissible interference against legitimate objectives-applies where there is no express increase in the authority of one branch at the expense of another, but there is some intrusion
into the constitutional functions of another branch. Its application is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. Olson.14 2 Mor136. Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55 (1983)).
137. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923, 959.
138. Id. at 957-58.
139. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 727 n.5.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 721.
142. 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988); see Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102
HARV. L. REV. 105, 109, 116, 127, 129-35 (1988) (discussing the extent to which the Court in
Morrison may have abandoned its previous insistence on ignoring policy and efficiency concerns in separation of powers decisions and arguing that Morrison is a logical extension of
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and the Court's toleration of independent regulatory agencies).
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rison addressed the constitutionality of the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics In Government Act, specifically the limitation
that an independent counsel may be removed by the Attorney General
only for good cause. 14 3
Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 19781' authorizes the
appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate and prosecute
specified senior executive branch officials who may have violated federal
criminal law. 145 The Attorney General, upon receipt of sufficiently specific and credible information, is required to conduct a preliminary inquiry and report to a special court within ninety days.14 6 If the Attorney
General's findings indicate reasonable grounds exist, the special court appoints an independent counsel and defines that official's jurisdiction to
investigate. 147
The independent counsel has almost all the investigative and
prosecutive functions and powers of the Attorney General and Justice
Department attorneys and must comply, generally, with all Justice Department policies. 14 8 An independent counsel is removable by Congress
through impeachment and conviction or by the Attorney General for
good cause, disability, incapacity, or other condition substantially impairing the performance of duties. 14 9 Members of Congress are authorized to request that the Attorney General appoint an independent
counsel.150
In Morrison, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee requested in 1985 that the Attorney General appoint an independent counsel to investigate potential false statements and obstruction of justice by
several former senior Justice Department officials."5 1 The Attorney General concluded that an independent counsel appointment was warranted
as to one official's testimony to Congress.15 2 Subsequently, the Attorney
General refused an independent counsel request for referral of the allegations against the other officials as matters related to the investigation, but
the special court ruled that the jurisdiction granted the independent
15 3
counsel was broad enough to cover these matters also.
143. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 659-60; see also 28 U.S.C. § 591 (1988).
144. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-99.
145. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 660.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(1).
28 U.S.C. §§ 591(c)(1), 593(b)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 594(a), (f).
28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 596.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 667-68.
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The former senior officials moved to quash subpoenas issued to them
by the independent counsel, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional.15 4 The district court upheld the statute, but the court of appeals
reversed that decision and ruled the
reversed.1 55 The Supreme 1Court
56
statute to be constitutional.
The Morrison case differed from Bowsher in that it did not involve
an attempt by Congress to enhance its own power to remove officials at
the expense of executive power. Thus, the aggrandizement or encroachment test was not applicable or helpful in deciding this case. However,
the congressional action embodied in the statute imposed a limit on the
Executive's claimed constitutional power to decide when and whether to
investigate and prosecute. This illustrated the need for an alternative test
to determine whether the statutory limitation impermissibly interfered
with the performance of presidential functions or reduced the Executive's
control over prosecutorial decisions. 5 7
In examining the question of general interference with presidential
functions, the Court in Morrison drew upon earlier precedents involving
limitations on the President's removal authority and explained that the
judicial role in such cases is to ensure that there is no unacceptable impingement upon the exercise of "the executive power" and the constitutional responsibility of the President to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." ' The role of Congress in the Act was limited to
requesting appointment of an independent counsel, receiving reports, and
generally overseeing an independent counsel's activities. 5 9 Nor was the
role assigned to the courts under the Act-appointing a counsel at the
request of the Attorney General and reviewing any decision to remove a
counsel-an usurpation of executive functions." 6
Examining the functions assigned to an independent counsel, the
Court noted that the counsel is an "inferior" officer with "limited jurisdiction and tenure" and no significant policymaking or administrative
authority."16 Accordingly, control of an independent counsel was not
''central to the functioning of the Executive Branch," and there was no
154. Id. at 668.
155. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.

654 (1988).
156. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
157. Id. at 689-90.
158. Id. at 690 (citing Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (holding that it was not
unconstitutional for Congress to limit presidential authority to remove members of the War
Crimes Commission), and Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
159. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 694.
160. Id. at 695.
161. Id. at 691.
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reason as a matter of constitutional law "that the counsel should be terminable at the will of the President."16' 2
The Act clearly reduced the degree of control over investigative and
prosecutorial decisions otherwise exercised by the President and the Attorney General.1 63 However, the Attorney General was empowered to
limit the jurisdiction of a counsel, supervise a counsel's work, and remove a counsel "for good cause." 1" The Act also required a counsel to
conform to Department of Justice policies whenever possible.1 65 Given
these qualifications and conditions, the Court ruled that the Act did not
impermissibly interfere with the constitutional power or functions of the
Executive.' 66 Because Morrison involved no impermissible interference
in executive functions by another branch, the Court did not proceed to
the second stage of determining whether there was an overriding need to
tolerate such interference in order to promote other legitimate governmental objectives that were sought to be achieved.
An example of this latter type of balancing was provided in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, involving a challenge by the former
President to provisions of law that required presidential records to be
167
preserved and reviewed by personnel from the National Archives.
The Nixon Court found that the limited intrusion into the confidentiality
of presidential communications posed by the required National Archives
review was justified by the purposes of the Act.1 68 These purposes included the preservation of accurate records to meet legitimate historical
and governmental needs, including the restoration of public confidence in
the political process; the need for Congress to understand the functioning
of the process in order to legislate properly; and the availability of such
materials in the event of relevant civil or criminal litigation.1 69
162. Id. at 691-92.
163. Id. at 695-96.
164. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 696-97. More recently, the Court has ruled that the power granted the President under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a), to appoint and remove
members of a commission to develop sentencing guidelines did not constitute authority to
interfere in the judicial or nonjudicial functions of the Judicial Branch. Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 409-11 (1989).
167. 433 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1977). See Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, §§ 101-106, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974).
168. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 454.
169. Id. at 453. A further example of balancing can be found in United States v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974), where the Court ruled that the requirements of fundamental due
process of law concerning the fair administration of the criminal justice system override a
generalized assertion of executive privilege to protect the confidentiality of a limited range of
presidential communications having demonstrated bearing upon a pending criminal case.
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Independence-Not Isolation
The Court in Morrison pointed out the importance, in adjudging

separation of powers disputes, of being mindful that it had "never" held
the Constitution to require the three branches of government to "operate
with absolute independence.""10
A statement years earlier to this effect
by Justice Robert H. Jackson was quoted to emphasize the point: "While
the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."' 7 1 While collaboration and
cooperation are, therefore, acceptable and necessary features of our constitutional
government,
usurpation
and
overdependence
are
impermissible.

IV.

Applying Separation of Powers Principles to Section 19

Applying the tests and standards elaborated in these cases to the
statutory succession system reveals serious separation of power problems
that extend well beyond the permissible scope of cooperation and interaction. The image of Acting President Barr arriving, hat in hand, at the
door to new Speaker Gonzalez's office in order to avoid supplantation
should clearly illustrate this problem.
In Bowsher, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress cannot enhance its own powers at the expense of the executive branch by exercising general authority to remove government officials who perform
executive functions.' 7 2 If this is true with regard to a lesser executive
official performing lesser executive functions, as was the case with the
Comptroller General in Bowsher, how much more severely would the
Court view a provision that authorizes congressional officers so arbitrarily to remove the very Chief Executive? Further, the Court stressed in
Bowsher that an official, once appointed, obviously can be expected to
fear the entity that has removal power more greatly than the authority
that was responsible for the appointment."' Under 3 U.S.C § 19, Congress has combined both the appointive and the removal authorities in
itself under a single statute.
170. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 654, 693-94 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at
707, and Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 425, 442).
171. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
172. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see supra notes 123-41 and accompanying
text.
173. 478 U.S. at 726.
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In Morrison, the separation of powers measure was whether the action in question interfered impermissibly with the performance of presidential functions, including the exercise of executive power and seeing to
the faithful execution of the laws.174 The looming omnipresence of a
congressional power to supplant an Acting President would so clearly
prevent the uninhibited performance of those functions as to require no
further elaboration.17 5 The statute in question in Morrison was saved
from constitutional infirmity because the roles it assigned to the other
branches and the functions of the independent counsel were so limited. 176
With regard to 3 U.S.C. § 19, however, the congressional role is unquestionably pivotal and open-ended and the Acting President's functions are
the essence of executive authority.
While it could be argued that the exigencies of a succession crisis
require direct congressional action, the scope of permissible action would
be limited to the enactment of a succession statute, with or without inclusion of the congressional officers in the line. By going further and including the unlimited supplantation provision in section 19, the statute moves
beyond the limits of permissibility. This feature is not necessary to deal
with the exigency and places the central function of the Executive, the
Presidency itself, at risk of undue congressional control. As the Supreme
Court noted in Chadha, constitutionally required burdens-here the separation of powers between the Executive and the Congress-are not always efficient or expeditious but must always be observed to avoid
177
arbitrary governmental action.
The interference with executive prerogatives caused by Congress's
action in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services was justified by the
overriding objective of restoring public confidence in the political process
and legitimate congressional and judicial interests in preserving and obtaining access to information required to perform their functions prop174. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988); see supra note 142 and accompanying
text.
175. The Court's jurisprudence in separation of powers cases can also be classified into a
formalistic and a functional approach. See, ag., Michael L. Yoder, Separation of Powers: No
Longer Simply Hanging in the Balance, 79 GEO. L.J. 173 (1990). The formalistic approach
envisions a line drawn by the Framers between the three branches, while functionalism allows
balancing the competing interests involved against the relevant constitutional provisions. Id.
The former can be criticized as too inflexible, the latter as overly uncertain. Id. A new hybrid
approach, relying on explicit grants of power or divining a proper balance between the
branches where there are no explicit grants, may have been signalled by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 486-87 (1989)
(Federal Advisory Committee Act does not apply to American Bar Association committee
evaluating judicial nominees). Id. at 174, 184-85.
176. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 693-97; see also notes 159-166.
177. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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erly. 175 The supplantation provisions in 3 U.S.C. § 19, by contrast, have
no legitimate relationship to the legislative functions of Congress. There
is no legitimate lawmaking function to be served by creating a supplicant
Acting President who can be supplanted by a congressional officer at any
moment of disapproval or disagreement. Acting President Barr should
be basing decisions regarding the release of classified information and the
appointment of independent counsels upon the best interests of the nation and relevant law and not whether keeping Speaker Gonzalez out of
evils.
the White House is the lesser of the available
The persistence of such a precarious relationship would serve only
to undermine public confidence in the political process by generating
fears of impermanence and suspicions of intrigue and undue congressional influence over the Acting President. The instability of this situation would be exacerbated by the fact that the President pro tempore of
the Senate need not consult with the Speaker before making a supplantation decision once the Speaker has initially declined to become Acting
President.19 In our hypothetical, the potential for Senator Byrd to
change his mind and decide that the road to retirement in West Virginia
should indeed run through the Oval Office might cause Speaker Gonzalez to act precipitously rather than risk losing a race to the Rose Garden.
This state of suspended political animation would surely aggravate
the institutional crisis that could be expected to pervade the public consciousness following the sequential or simultaneous loss of an elected
President and Vice President. Following the initial shock, there would
appear as Acting President a dimly known and wholly unelected former
cabinet official-in our hypothetical, Attorney General Barr. That official would announce to an astonished public that he had assumed the
Presidency under the authority of obscure constitutional and statutory
provisions that have never been used before."' 0
The media would quickly begin to focus public attention on the legal
possibilities for further change involving only slightly less obscure congressional figures. The potential for maneuvering and personal advance178. 433 U.S. 425, 452-53 (1977); see supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Emperor,supra note 13, at 1438.
180. The international dimension in such a situation is illustrated by a cable sent by former
National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane to his successor Admiral John Poindexter expressing frustration in dealing with the Iranian Government after the fall of the Shah: "[It was
as if] after a nuclear attack a surviving tailor became Vice President, a recent graduate student
became Secretary of State, and a bookie became interlocutor for all discourse with foreign
countries." Denise Brown, Book Review, FRIDAY REv. DEFENSE LITERATURE (1989) (reviewing SAMUEL SEGEV, THE IRANIAN TRIANGLE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF ISRAEL'S ROLE
IN THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1988)) (on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly).
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ment would have the effect of making every decision and every action by
the Acting President, Speaker, and President pro tempore suspect and
subject to the most intense scrutiny for its true motivation. Factions for
and against supplantation would grow on all sides. In a time of great
peril to its institutions, the country would likely be reluctant to unite
behind an Acting President who would not reasonably be expected to
complete the term. The government would pause while all eyes watched
the drama play itself out and enemies at home and abroad could be expected to take full advantage of the breakdown of orderly decision-making in Washington. Such a situation should not be allowed to develop in
fact and the supplantation provision of section 19 should therefore be
removed or revised.

V.

Remedial Possibilities

The Supreme Court has recognized that certain constitutional provisions may be overcome by other constitutional powers in a national
emergency where necessary to the preservation of the nation and the ful-

fillment of other constitutional responsibilities.181 Nonetheless, it appears doubtful from the evolving separation of powers principles the
Court has developed that the existence of even the most extreme emergency situation could justify so direct a threat to bedrock principles of
separation of powers as is contained in the congressional supplantation
authority of section 19.182 Congress has provided a means of ensuring
succession if there are vacancies in both the Presidency and the Vice
Presidency as authorized by Article II, and no compelling constitutional
181. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (constitutional provisions
establishing the war power and power to raise and support armies override Militia Training
Clause).
182. The Supreme Court has held statutes and executive decisions unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds even when they have been instituted in response to pressing national
crises. See, ag., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1980) (crisis of the increasing federal deficit);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (crisis of steel workers'
strike during wartime). Of course, a statute is not insulated from a finding of unconstitutionality merely because a President has signed it into law. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at
719 n.1. Neither does approval by the Congress preserve a statute from constitutional review.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Nor is the argument that the law is "efficient, convenient and useful" in
facilitating a government function, such as preferring succession by elected officials, sufficient
to protect it from a finding of unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 736
(citing INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)).
As one commentator has observed, "The principle of separation of powers, the Court
[has] explained .... cannot yield to claimed gains in efficiency, for the constitutional rule that
is subverted one day with the best intentions can just as easily be evaded the next day with the
worst." Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARv. L. Rv. 105, 105
(1988).
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imperative justifies the continual potential for supplantation of the Acting President. No proper governmental purpose can be served by maintaining this situation. Any interest in congressional primacy and any
preference for succession by an elected official would be fulfilled by allowing the congressional leadership to have a single, final opportunity to
become Acting President.
Accordingly, Congress should repeal or revise the supplantation
provision of section 19(d)(2). The congressional officers should be placed
on the same footing as cabinet officers and have no further entitlement to
the office if they are unable or unwilling to become the Acting President
when vacancies occur in the Presidency and Vice Presidency. An alternative, preserving the preference for elected officials, would be to limit
the congressional officers' power to supplant to a short period of a few
days after the cabinet officer has assumed the office of Acting President.' 83 If deemed absolutely necessary to preserve congressional preference in extreme situations, a similar, short period could be allowed for a
supplantation decision by any new Speaker or President pro tempore
who is elected to fill one of the congressional leadership positions that
may have been vacant at the time the cabinet member exercised the option. It would not be prudent, however, to go further and allow each
new congressional officer elected during the term of an Acting President
to exercise such an option since this would result in the same perpetual
uncertainty that exists under the current provision of section 19. Appropriate changes in the statute will preserve congressional prerogatives
while respecting the separation of powers and promoting bold action by
an Acting President in the furtherance of the functions of that office.
If Congress cannot be persuaded to repeal or revise the provision, a
party with a demonstrable interest, such as the President-under his general responsibility to "preserve, protect and defend" the ConstitutionS 4 -or the Secretary of State-as the senior cabinet member in the
line of succession-should consider a judicial challenge to section 19. ' 85
183. Section 4 of the 25th Amendment limits the Vice President to a four-day period to
decide whether to contest a presidential declaration that a pre-existing disability has been removed. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.

184. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
185. The increase in separation of powers litigation in recent years has been attributed
principally to growing congressional inability or unwillingness to make difficult policy choices;
to heightened executive branch willingness, even eagerness, to claim that any action touching
its constitutional prerogatives constitutes undue interference; and to Congress' failure to anticipate adequately separation of powers issues as it legislates. See, eg., Alan B. Morrison, A NonPower Looks at Separation ofPowers, 79 GEO. L.J. 281, 306-10 (1990). The § 19 supplantation
power would appear to fall within the latter category and any action by the Executive to cure it
should not be viewed as a "hair trigger" response to a perceived slight. Id. at 308.
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Such an action would be based upon a claim against the Congress of
unconstitutionally enhancing its own powers at the expense of the Executive as well as impermissibly interfering with the conduct of executive
functions.
It may be argued that such a challenge should await an actual attempt by a congressional officer to exercise the power reserved in section
19 to remove an Acting President.18 6 This argument is undermined,
however, by the majority holding of the Supreme Court in Bowsher recognizing that the damage from such a removal provision arises from its
mere existence and its potential effect upon the conduct of an executive
officer. 187 Thus, a judicial examination of the constitutionality of the removal provision in section 19 need not await an actual effort to remove
the Acting President.18 8
Initiating litigation against congressional officers as potential presidential successors to remedy the constitutional flaw in section 19 would
be unprecedented. The viability of an attempt to resolve competing
claims to the Presidency in advance may be viewed by some as too speculative and not "ripe," or as a "political question" not fit for judicial resolution."8 9 Bowsher, however, made such a preemptive action available
where there is the type of presumed, persistent damage to the official's
freedom of action that attends an overreaching removal statute.1 90 Also,
the textual and prudential bases for the political question doctrine would
not apply to justify judicial avoidance of this issue. The matter requires
constitutional interpretation of a nature that is committed to the courts
and there are clear judicial standards-i.e., the separation of powers principles applied in Bowsher-that are available for its resolution. 1 9 ' Further, there are specific legal and judicial grounds to satisfy the standing
and other federal jurisdictional requirements that would have to be met
in order to proceed to the merits.
One possible basis for such an action would be a Justice Department
request for a writ of quo warranto (by what authority). This writ has its
186. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 778 n.1 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 727 n.5.
188. Id.
189. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (explaining the basis and measures for determining when a political question is before the Court).
190. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. at 727 n.5.
191. Compare Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73

HARv. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1959) with Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 75-76 (1961) (arguing conversely that the
true reason for the political question doctrine is that determination of the issue has been assigned to another branch of government, which requires an interpretation, or that some discretionary functions of political institutions are better done without rules).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[V/ol. 20:105

roots in the common law and is a means by which the state can act to
protect itself and the public welfare generally against false claims to office.192 While this is an extraordinary writ whose use against the sovereign was not contemplated by the common law, 19 3 the situation in which
its use is here envisioned would itself involve an extraordinary threat
against the sovereign itself. A District of Columbia statute authorizes
the Attorney General and the United States Attorney for the District to
bring a federal district court quo warranto action against any individual
who "usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises.., a public
office of the United States ..,."194 Actions, albeit unsuccessful, have
been brought under this statute and it would appear on its face to be a
highly appropriate means to contest section 19 within the District of Columbia federal courts as an unconstitutional intrusion into the
Presidency.195
In addition, the Supreme Court has found that state laws requiring
government officials to resign before announcing an intent to seek higher
office present a legitimate case and controversy involving real, not speculative, harm. 196 The officials involved could not be forced to resign from
office to announce their candidacy before suing for relief from the requirement to resign. 197 Thus, the fact that a particular action necessary
to trigger a statute has not yet occurred does not preclude a party whose
political activities could be affected by that action from contesting the
validity of the statute. This principle can be readily adapted to support
an action by a cabinet member, such as the Secretary of State, whose
actions as Acting President, or even whose decision as to whether to be192. See, eg., Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 726 F.2d 203, 204-05 n. 1 (5th Cir.
1984). See generally FORREST G. FERRIS & FORREST G. FERRIS JR., THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES §§ 101-06 (1926). While some courts have held that such a writ is
not available in a federal court absent a statutory basis for the claim, see, e.g., United States ex
rel. Wisconsin v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 F.2d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 957 (1958). But see Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 1982) (important
federal interests support limited availability of quo warrantoproceedings). Others have found
such authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(2) when the action is brought by a
U.S. Government official such as a U.S. Attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Lemke, 310 F.
Supp. 1298, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1969), rev'd, 439 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1971); Blackburn v. O'Brien,
289 F. Supp. 289, 292-93 (W.D. Va. 1968) (dictum).
193. See, e.g., JAMES HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 593 (3d ed. 1896).
194. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3501-3502 (1981).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932) (Senate effort to establish FCC
Chairman's lack of authority to hold office, under predecessor statute); Newman v. United
States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547 (1915) (only a claimant to office can bring such a suit,
under predecessor statute).
196. See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 961-62 (1982).
197. Id.
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come Acting President should the need arise, would be affected by the
potential for supplantation under section 19.
The "standing" of such an official to bring an action in this regard is
further supported by the precedent of allowing members of Congress to
sue the congressional leadership based upon an alleged violation of the
requirement in Article I of the Constitution that all revenue bills originate in the House.198 The suit was allowed to proceed based on the finding that it related to a "cognizable" legal interest the members shared in
a definable constitutional process. 9 9 This condition applies equally to a
cabinet member who shares a cognizable legal interest in the proper
working of the constitutional process of presidential succession.
Finally, a United States Senator has been adjudged to be a proper
party to bring an action challenging the use of a presidential "pocket
veto" under Article I, section 7 of the Constitution providing that a bill
enacted by Congress will not become law if the President does not return
it within ten days due to the adjournment of Congress. 2° The court
noted that standing to sue requires a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a judicially recognized controversy. 20° One traditional approach
requires a "logical nexus" between the litigant's status and the claim to
be adjudicated.20 2 Such a nexus was found because the disposition of the
matter would "determine the effectiveness vel non of [the Senator's] actions as a legislator .... ,o1 Similarly, the effectiveness of a potential
presidential succession should prove sufficient to support an action contesting the statute.
Another approach requires the litigant to show injury in fact and an
interest arguably within the zone to be protected by the statute or constitutional provision in question. 2" In this regard, the court found the
pocket veto provision of the Constitution to be "one of several which
implement the 'separation of powers' doctrine" 20 5 and that,
Taken together, these provisions define the prerogatives of
each governmental branch in a manner which prevents overreaching by any one of them. The provision under discussion allocates
198. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 950-53 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) (just because a dispute arises under the Origination
Clause of the Constitution does not mean it is a nonjustifiable political question).
199. Id. at 951.
200. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (pocket veto of the Family
Practice of Medicine Act).
201. Id. at 433.
202. Id. (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 434.
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to the executive and legislative branches their respective roles ....
When either branch perceives an intrusion upon its legislative
power by the other, this clause is appropriately invoked. The gist
of [the] complaint is that such an intrusion has occurred as a result
of the President's misinterpretation of this clause ....206
It was significant to the court that "over the long term," the Executive's
broad application of the pocket veto power threatened to diminish congressional influence in the legislative process and "axiomatic" that this
20 7
would diminish the role of each individual participant in it.
It was sufficient for standing purposes to allege that conduct by executive branch officials amounted to an unlawful nullification of the institutional and individual exercise of their assigned powers under the
Constitution. 21 8 Thus, standing was established where the official in
question represented an institutional interest in ensuring that the powers
of the two branches remain in balance.20 9 Participants in the succession
process can demonstrate a logical nexus by claiming that section 19 will
diminish their effectiveness to act as President. They may also claim a
recognizable interest in maintaining the constitutional balance by contesting the nullification of their assigned powers as Acting President
under the Constitution.
A further consideration for any court before which such an action is
brought is that the damage from leaving the statute in place, especially in
light of the extreme circumstances that would breed a supplantation decision under section 19, are so evident and potentially extreme as to justify judicial review in advance. The Supreme Court has recognized the
significance of such circumstances by reviewing a variety of challenges to
provisions relating to removal of government officials.2 10 If the matter is
left to a time when an Acting President is in office and can be threatened
with removal or until an actual attempt at removal occurs, the resulting
dispute over the validity of the provision could paralyze the leadership of
the nation and undermine public confidence at the very moment when
sure and swift decision-making is most urgently required for national
survival.
As the Supreme Court itself put it, albeit in the reverse context of
congressional fears of presidential removal power, "Congress did not
wish to have hang over the [War Claims] Commission the Damocles'
206. Id.
207. Id. at 435-36.
208. Id. at 436.
209. See id.
210. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349 (1958).
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sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choosing."211
Conclusion
The supplantation provision of 3 U.S.C. § 19 represents a dangerous
and pernicious breach of the separation of powers framework that has
been created to prevent the Legislature from accruing excessive control
over the actions and motivations of the Executive. In a moment of maximum national distress, the strofigest leadership is required. Unless Congress, or the courts if necessary, devise a remedy, the nation will sooner
or later suffer the spectacle of a little known and uncertain former cabinet officer attempting to steer the ship of state with the encumbering fetters of the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the
Senate on the tiller.
211. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958); see also 295 U.S. at 356.

